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BY SENATOR DAN McCORQUODALE 
The Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights 
and Securities Transactions having studied the issue of corporate 
takeovers, submits the following cone sions and recommendations 
to the Legislature: 
Conclusions: 
• A California corporate takeover law would be an ineffective 
protection of corporations, workers and shareholders since it 
would apply to a minimal number of corporations having business 
contacts in the State. 
• A national law requiring minimal standards of conduct for 
corporations, bidders and investors would reduce jurisdictional 
competition and claims among states. 
• Problems associated with corporate takeovers such as depletion 
of assets and resources, debt burdens to corporations and other 
dislocations to the State's economy should be resolved as 
issues separate from tender offer legislation. 
Recommendations: 
• The California Legislature should support federal preemption of 
state takeover laws. 
• The California Legislature should support state legislative 
proposals which will add to the protection of shareholders and 
pension investments. 
• The California Legislature 
proposals relating to takeover 
potential for economic hardsh 
shareholders. 
state legislative 
activities when there is a 
to small corporations and their 
Dan McCorquodale is Chairman of the Senate Committee on Corporate 
Governance, Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions and 




Thirty-seven states have passed some form of legislation to 
restrict hostile corporate takeovers. Twenty-seven have restricted 
offers. California has not and should not. 
A California takeover law will effect relatively few corporations, 
since few have either chosen to incorporate in the State or have 
sufficient business contacts to come under the jurisdiction of the 
State's Corporation Code Section 2115. A law will neither abet 
nor deter raids of most corporations. The passage of takeover 
legislation at this time would be an ineffective protection of 
shareholders, workers and the state's economy, as well as a decep-
tion of public policy of the first order. 
Without addressing specific legislative proposals, the Senate 
Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Secur-
ities Transactions recommends federal preemption of all states' 
laws relating directly to takeover activities. The preemption as 
described by the Commission should be limited to takeover activities 
and not infringe upon the appropriate state interests of corporate 
governance and internal affairs. 
A line should also be drawn to separate internal management affairs 
of a corporation from takeover issues of corporate control. In 
addition, problems often associated with takeovers, such as plant 
closings or depletion of assets and resources, should be resolved 
as separate issues. This is not to diminish the seriousness of 
these issues or their impact on California's economy, resources 
and workers. 
The recommendation is not intended to be prescriptive. California 
should have a voice in determining federal standards, but it is 
presumptuous to assume the actions of Congress and contradictory 
to circumscribe the rules for other states. 
Lack of Jurisdiction 
In most issues of corporate control, California is effectively 
preempted by other states, such as Delaware, by virtue of a 
corporation having the ability to select a choice of law through 
incorporation. Even if a corporation had a majority of its property, 
payroll, sales, shareholder and its headquarters located in Cali-
fornia, would not exclusively come under California laws should 
it choose to incorporate in another state. 
The shocking reality is that despite having the sixth largest 
economy in the world, California can claim authority over only 
three Fortune 500 companies and less than four percent of New York 
Stock Exchange listed companies. Corporate laws affecting Times-
Mirror, Wells Fargo or Atlantic Richfield for example are made not 
in Sacramento or Washington, D.C., but in Dover, Delaware. The 
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mer of takeover leg does 
not have jurisdiction over 
It is also quite clear that California cannot enact corporation laws 
even if predisposed to do so, which would become as attractive 
to corporate management as the laws of Delaware or other states 
competing for incorporations. 
It should be clear that not all of Delaware's laws adversely affect 
shareholders' interests. In some instances such as the declaration 
of dividends or valuation of acquisitions, Delaware law is quite 
favorable to shareholders. 
However, California should not enter in to a competition for incor-
porations which it cannot win without substantially redirecting 
state law. The State should have the freedom to determine laws 
based upon economic, social, cultural and historical justification 
rather than a response to coercive competition between states. 
Delaware as an example, has a free hand to enact corporate laws 
which have relatively little effect on their own citizens except 
to provide additional revenue in franchise taxes and a dispropor-
tional effect on other states ability to regulate corporations. 
As a small state with a modest economy, Delaware is the over-
whelming choice of incorporation for corporations having their 
principal business contacts in other states. In addition, Del-
aware courts have established a body of case law unrivaled by 
other states. The incentives for Delaware incorporation are not 
likely to be reversed by the passage of a California takeover law. 
A law which would likely reverse past state policy. 
Other states such as New York that have passed takeover laws with 
less balance and equity than the Delaware takeover law at the behest 
of their business lobbyists with such features as a five year pro-
hibition on the divestiture of assets, lengthy disclosures and 
long tender periods have not experienced a return of corporations 
from Delaware. In most instances, state legislatures have reacted 
to the intimidation of a e corporation's threat to leave for 
Delaware, by immediately enacting tive legislation. This has 
been the case in Arizona (Greyhound) , Minnesota (Dayton-Hudson) , 
New Jersey (Singer), Washington (Boeing), and Ohio (Goodyear) to 
name a few examples. 
The California legislature, to credit, has resisted 
overreaction despite takeover attempts on some of the major 
corporations in the state. Although California would like to pro-
vide a better business climate, that goal is unlikely to be realized 
by legislation that has a narrow application of relatively few 
corporations incorporated in California. California laws do not 
protect Delaware corporations. 
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California Alternatives 
California has three alternatives: (l) do nothing and continue to 
abrogate authority over large corporations with substantial busi-
ness contacts, (2) pass a takeover law which applies only to a 
relatively few corporations, or (3) assert jurisdiction through 
federal preemption of state laws by virtue of its Congressional 
representation. In light of these facts, the best alternative is 
to attempt to assert jurisdiction through federal preemption of 
state laws. Preemption would set a floor for shareholder protec-
tions and a ceiling for management prerogatives in the governance 
of corporations. States would be free to set additional standards 
above the floor or below the ceiling. With such a minimum federal 
standard, even set at a base approximating existing Delaware law 
(which is not being advocated) , states would be free to decide an 
appropriate standard for governance of corporations with the cer-
tainty that Delaware or some other state would not continue the 
downward spiral of shareholder rights. 
There is nothing innately wrong with states having different stan-
dards for corporate behavior. What is divisive is the competition 
to lower standards in the "race to the bottom." Minimal federal 
preemptive standards would establish a finish line for the race to 
the bottom. 
In addition, the significance of multi-state claims and disputes 
over choice of law would be minimized as' the .disparities in state 
laws are restricted. This position is not contrary to the states' 
rights claim which was a major point of contention in the Indiana 
takeover case. To the contrary, such a proposal would promote 
states' rights. Differences in governance standards should reflect 
regional anomalies, not state entrepreneurialism. To restate the 
earlier question: Would California be better served being preempted 
by Congress or preempted by the Delaware Legislature? The current 
system in which a post office drop determines political and cor-
porate behavior is totally irrational. It is an unimaginable 
metaphor for democracy. 
What is a more reasonable alternative? A federal takeover law 
should recognize two precepts: 
(1) It should be limited to the regulation of changes in corporate 
control. Responsibilities for corporate law traditionally vested 
with states should remain with states. 
(2) It must be consistent with the consideration of neutrality 
among shareholders and unbiased between contending parties vying 
for ownership as presumed by the Williams Act. 
The purpose of any law should be to allow the shareholders to make 
an informed decision regarding the ownership of a corporation free 
from coercive offers from both bidders and management. With the 
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changes in owner corpora s to a sh t of corporate 
equity to large pension funds perceptions of bias may have changed. 
This is but another reason to reexamine federal law. 
A Final Perspective 
California has been affected by the loss of jobs, resources and 
disruptions to the economy as much if not more than other states 
due to corporate takeovers of the last few years. Some of this 
disruption can be considered the price for the free movement of 
capital. 
Considering the state has long been a net importer of capital, 
California has profited from a total increase in jobs and other 
benefits to the overall economy. Some measure providing for the 
protection of natural resources or sudden economic adjustment are 
warranted, but they would be ineffective if their application is 
limited to California corporations. Often the economic problems 
associated with takeovers are a result of poor business judgement 
and tactics in gaining or maintaining control of a corporation. 
The State cannot correct problems of business judgement and often 
lacks the authority to restrain harmful tactics. 
The State's policy should be to unveil the myth of legal control 
over corporations and restore jurisdiction to California. That can 
only take place through federal legislation. Just as in the story 
of the Emperor's New Clothes, California bills itself as the sixth 
largest economy in the world without any control over the gover-
nance of the largest corporations doing business in the state. The 
Commission should advise the state of the nakedness of its authority 
and debunk the myth of state jurisdiction. 
The Governance Commission 
The California Senate created the Commission on Corporate Governance, 
Shareholder Rights and Securities Transactions, in 1986 to evaluate 
laws relating to and practices of corporate management, investment 
managers and investors, with particular concern to reconciling the 
need to establish stability for corporations operating in or desiring 
to locate in California with the fiduciary obligations of invest-
ment managers and pension fund trustees to prudently invest share-
holder funds. The Commission's membership represents prominent 
members of the business, academic, investment and political commu-
nities. The Commission sponsors legislation and its members are 
often called upon for consultation or testimony on corporation and 
securities law issues before the Legislature. 
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REPORT AND COMMENTARY BY 
ON CORPORATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 
As discussed and 
meeting the following 
members of the California 






letter by members of 
The undersigned members of the Cal islature desire to 
express to you our support for the enactment by Congress of the 
United States of certain f minimum standards governing 
corporate takeover practices. We believe that recent events have 
underscored the impractical of current attempts at regulation 
by the states. Corporate takeover activity is a national pheno-
menon that can only be regulated effectively at the national level, 
in a uniform fashion that pre-empts confl state laws. 
In order to ensure that the federal standards cover the field and 
yet do not overly restrict smaller or private transactions for 
which there is less reason to intrude state law, we suggest 
that these standards be made applicable to all corporations with 
a class of securities registered 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 or subject to the requirements of Section 15(d) 
of that Act. 
We suggest that 
of concern: 
\1) Voting Rights. We 
based on acquisition of 
shares are held, or which 
ic shareholders, be 1 
business justification exists for 
such limitations are otherwise 
to insure fairness. Examples 
be where shareholders ( 
limitation, where the 1 
the time any s of that 
the regulated nature of a 's 
tinctions in voting power. 
(2) "Poison Pills." We 
in many cases operate to 
to benefit from takeover 
a prohibition on "poison ls" 





imitations or where 
circumstances designed 
ju ications would 
} approved the 
shares prior to 
public, or where 
requ dis-
so-called "poison pills" 
opportunity 
, we would support 
shareholder 
after adoption in 
to continue in feet, as 1 as approval at 
least once every three years thereafter (i.e., a "sunset" provision). 
" a on the se by 
shares from a shareholder 
less than one unless one of the 
formulas s to ensure that a shareholder does not 
receive an unfair premium applies: (i) the purchase price is equal 
to or less than the market pr the shares on the third day 
following public announcement of a takeover bid or the thirty-day 
average post-announcement market price (whichever is elected by 
the target company); (ii) the shareholders have approved the trans-
action by a majority vote; or (i ) the same offer is made to all 
shareholders or the sell shareholder sells its shares pursuant 
to an agreement entered into prior to the time that the selling 
shareholder purcha a ificant interest. 
(4) "Fair Price." We support the "fair price" type of provision 
adopted by several corporations and enacted into law in several 
states and suggest that it be adopted at the federal level. Such 
provisions lly require a majority vote of the minority stock-
holders prior to a iness combination with a substantial share-
holder, unless the price to be paid is equal to or more than the 
greater of: (i) the highest price paid by the offeror in the past 
two year periodi (ii) an amount which bears the same or greater 
percentage relationship, in a tender offer situation, to the market 
price prior to the announcement of the merger as the highest price 
per share paid by the offeror during the tender offer bears to the 
market price of the immediately prior to the commencement of 
the tender offer; or ( } an amount equal to the earnings per 
share for the corporation's previous year multiplied by the then 
price/earn ratio of offeror. 
(5) Schedule 13D Filing Deadline. We support shortening from ten 
days to five days the period in which acquirors have to file an 
initial Schedule 13D, and support a prohibition on the acquisition 
of additional shares until the Schedule 13D has been filed. 
(6) Open Market Purchases Following a Tender Offer. We believe 
that where a bidder terminates a tender offer and immediately 
thereafter engages massive open market purchases, the purposes 
of the Williams Act are significantly frustrated. Accordingly, we 
advocate prohibiting acquisitions for thirty days following the 
termination of a tender offer, or at least until the tender offer 
would expired by its original terms. 
(7) Favoring Acquisitions in Excess of a 15% Interest by Tender 
Offer. We believe that federal law should encourage acquisitions 
of outstanding shares in excess of 15% of a corporation's outstanding 
stock to be made by tender offer only, and therefore subject to the 
Williams Act. Excepted from this requirement would be stock ac-
quired involuntarily by gift or otherwise; stock acquired by statu-
tory merger or consolidation; stock acquired during the previous 
12 months that did not exceed 2% of the outstanding stock of that 
-7-
class; b business; 
purchasers exempted by the s ss owners 
of 85% or more of the corporation's stock; and stock that is 
acquired by a syndicate or other group that does not purchase addi-
tional shares after acquiring the required 15% or greater amount 
except by tender offer or purchase from the issuer. 
(8) Disclosure of Control Intent in Schedule 13D Statement. We 
believe that the intentions of potential acquirers must be detailed 
within their Schedule 13D filing. If the acquisition of shares is 
stated to be for investment purposes only, then any subsequent take-
over bids should be prohibited until an intention to obtain control 
has been disclosed and an appropriate waiting period has expired 
or until the approval of shareholders (other than management) has 
been obtained. 
These proposed minimum standards were developed by the California 
Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and 
Securities Tranactions. No matter what form these proposed minimum 
standards ultimately take, we believe that some measures for the 
governance of corporate takeover activity need to be enacted at the 
federal level. 
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STATE OF AND TRANSPORTATION AGENCY GEORGE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER 
600 S. COMMONWFAITH 
LOS ANG.!! I 5, CAlifORNIA 90C)(J5 
(213) 736.-2741 
March 10, 1988 
The Honorable Dan McCorquodale 
Member of the Senate 
State Capitol, Room 4032 
Sacramento, CA ~5814 
Dear Senator McCorquodale: 
REPLY REFER TO: 
FilE NO. --- ---
The Department of Corporations has reviewed the initial rough 
draft of a proposed Resolution of the California Legislature 
regarding corporate takeovers. This resolution would recommend 
to the U. s. Congress the enactment of certain federal minimum 
standards in this area and was proposed by a member of the SR 41 
Commission's Subcommittee on Takeovers. The Department finds 
itself supporting many of the sentiments expressed by Mr. Willie 
R. Barnes in his February 19, 1988 letter to Michael J. Halloran, 
the draftsman of the proposed resolution. In general, we believe 
the proposed resolution is excessively and unnecessarily 
detailed. Furthermore, the provision dealing with voting rights 
is objectionable to the Department. 
In our opinion, the proposed resolution would do better to focus, 
in a straight-forward manner, on the need for a national, uniform 
standard for takeovers accomplished by purchase of securities 
rather than proposing such detailed and extensive provisions. We 
believe this focus would better serve the SR 41 Commission, also. 
Below, please find our specific comments: 
1. As Mr. Barnes points out in his February 19th letter, the 
provision for shareholder approval overrides substantially 
diminishes (indeed, defeats) any minimum standards sought to be 
adopted. The result of the shareholder override provisions is 





-2- March 10, 1988 
and Exchange 
(Paragraph 
two reasons for 
e As proposed, this rule sets limited disenfranchisement 
standards (some wi say are no standards at all) 
with respect to voting rights common stock listed on a 
national securities exchange or quoted on NASDAQ. As you 
know, the appropriateness of these proposed standards also 
is the subject of the California debate under the California 
securities Law on minimum voting rights standards for 
securities listed on the NYSE and ASE or designated national 
market system securities on NASDAQ. Specifically, Senate 
Bill 451 proposes to amend subdivision (o) of Corporations 
Code Section 25100 to include proposed Rule 19c-4 standards. 
This bill is presently before the California Legislature. 
The inclusion of the proposed SEC rule in a proposed 
resolution the California Legislature to the U. s. 
Congress states, in effect, that this is the California 
position on minimum voting rights when in fact the 
California Legislature has not yet spoken. As you know, 
California has a long history support for a one share, 
one vote standard which we are hopeful will continue as 
California's standard for common stock. Accordingly, we 




equity listed on national securities exchanges or 
quoted on the NASD interdealer quotation system. This 
legislation HR 2668 (Rinaldo) HR 2172 (Markey). In 
our opinion, would be preferable for the California 
Legislature to lend its support to these bills, particularly 
HR 2172, than to attempt to fashion other legislative 
recommendations out of whole cloth. 
3. We agree with Mr. Barnes' comment regarding the 
appropriateness of the inclusion of Paragraph (g) in the proposed 
resolution. The threshold for a freeze-out of minority 
shareholders in a merger (whether it should remain at 90% or be 
reduced to 85%) should be a decision of the Legislature in the 
normal course of its deliberations and should not be presented in 
the form of a resolution requesting action of the u. S. Congress. 
4. We are uncertain why a restriction on the acquisition of more 
than 15% of equity securities (Paragraph (m)) is necessary or 
desirable. We believe greater explanation is required on the 






request the draftsman 
Commission members as 
these provisions are 
101 19 8 
j l) n) , we find we 
we can comment. Consequently, we 
to the SR 41 
sought and why 
These are weighty issues. SR 41 comprises a 
number of individuals with substantial practical experience in 
the securities area and who devote many hours of their time to 
the Commission. Many of the Commission members saw the 
Subcommittee draft f at conclusion of 
last full Commiss I strongly suggest that these 
issues receive a complete hearing at a full Commission meeting 
before a recommendation is made to the Legislature. 
Very truly yours, 
CHRISTINE W. BENDER 
Commissioner of Corporations 
(213) 736-3481 
CWB:kw 
cc: Members, Senate 
Shareholder Rights 
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Michael J. Hal ran, 
February 19, 1988 
Page 2 
for example) fit easil in either category and achieving an 
a ropriate ance 1 not ise. Nonetheless, the 
potential erosion of the traditi power of the states to 
regulate the internal affairs of corporations is of concern. 
Secondly, and historically, there has not been general support 
for enactment of federal nimum corporate standards and we run 
the risk of federal preemption without a floor of minimum corporate 
standards. I believe, however, that this risk can be minimized 
if our recommendations are narrowly defined. 
With these general observations behind me, I do have a 
few specific comments on the various provisions contained in the 
proposed Resolution: 
l. Shareholder Approval Override. My reaction to the 
shareholder approval override is that it defeats or diminishes 
the objective sought to be achieved, i.e. minimum standards of 
fairness. Allowing a majority of the shareholders to limit the 
voting rights of the minority is pretty much the status quo. A 
number of public companies, with the approval of shareholders, 
have gone from one class of common to two classes of common, with 
disproportionate voting rights between the two classes. Some 
have gone even further to restr the voting power of a 
shareholders once his ownership reaches a certain threshold (i.e. 
15% of the outstanding shares). 
I am having difficulty reconciling minimum standards 
of fairness with the concept of shareholder approval override. 
2. Subdivision (c) Enactment Into Law of Restrictions 
Contained In Proposed SEC Rule 19c-4 Prohibiting Restrictions on 
Voting Rights is misplaced and should be eliminated. Proposed 
Rule l9c-4 would constitute a mini~um standard regarding the 
types of voting securities permitted to be listed on a national 
securities exchange or authorized for quotation reporting. 
Proposed Rule 19c-4 addresses more a corporate governance issue 
(i.e. One Share One Vote) rather than an anti-takeover measure. 
In fact, some states, including California, prefer a true one 
share one vote over the SEC's proposal. Whether or not the SEC 
adopts 19c-4, there is no reason for the Congress to take away 
the power of the states in this basic corporate governance area. 
3. I am opposed to the inclusion of Subdivision (g) 
in the Resolution. While Subdivision (g) is titled 'Assurance of 
Right to Perform Second Step "Cash Out" Merger', it might also be 
titled "Facilitation of Freeze-out of Minority Shareholders". 
What Subdivision (g) will do is change existing California law. 
As you know, of course, there are parallel provisions in the 
present General Corporations Law (Sections 1101, lOOl(d) and 407) 
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which prohibit a ca t nor i :rs, where 
the majority shareho 90\ or voting power of 
the corporation and such sha consummate a short 
form merger under Section 1110 to same objective. 
Subdivision (e) to Section 1001 1101.1 do permit the 
cash-out of minority shar 90\ threshold is not 
met if the Commissioner Corporations has approved the terms 
and conditions of the trans-action in fairness of such terms and 
conditions. A similar out is r insurance companies, 
public utili ties and banks. a determination is to be made 
that freeze-out of minority rs is appropriate at 85% 
rather than 90%, I believe that poli decision should evolve 
through the normal legislative 
4. Subdivision (i) raises some interesting issues and 
a further exposition of its intended effect may be warranted. As 
you know, of course, the significance of the exclusivity of the 
appraisal remedy has been e by the 1977 General Corporation 
Law and the availability of f ral private remedies. In any 
event, I question, however, whether this is the forum to deal with 
these issues. 
5. Subdivision (m) - Acquisition of Greater than 15% 
Interest by Tender Offer Only. Until I have had an opportunity 
to explore the full ramifications vision, I am with-
holding judgment. I am not exceptions 
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state of California 
Senate Office of Research 
1100 J Street, Suite 650 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Dick: 
19, 1988 
A prior commitment requires me to be out of the state on the 
day of the Commission's next meeting. Because the Commission may 
take up at that meeting the proposal that California recommend 
federal preemption in the takeover area, I thought I should make 
my views known. Please to circulate this letter to 
other members of the Commission if you think it appropriate. 
I fully support the proposal that California recommend 
federal preemption. The principal argument in favor or 
preserving state regulation that competition among states 
leads to the 11 best" laws as corporate managers select 
the state whose corporate statute they preceive as most efficient 
and state legislators respond by enacting efficient statutes in 
order to secure the revenues associated with in-state 
incorporations.! However argument might 
to s with 
If, however, 
, as they quite 
management's 
management's 
1 interests in 
selection of the most 
lin this regard, it might noted that over the period from 
1960 to 1981, the percentage of Delaware's total tax collections 
that came from its corporate from 10.9% to 
2 4 • 9% • R. Gil son, .=T~h~e:......::!L:::!l:a~w!!--a~n~d:......!:F_,i~n.,!.;a::l:Jn~c=e~o:..;;f..__::C~o::.::rn!:.J:::.o~r.l:!a:.l:t:.:.e~A~c~gu~.=i.=s~i:...l:t:..:i:.::o~n=s 
1076, note 146 (1986). 
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Dick Damm 
February 19, 1988 
Page 2 
efficient state law, but, rather, one that provides managers at 
least a base level of protection from hostile takeover 
activity.2 The recent performance of the Delaware legislature, 
it seems to me, brooks of no other explanation. 
Although I favor a general statement supporting federal 
preemption of state takeover regulation -- issues of national 
importance should be resolved by Congress, not the Delaware 
Legislature -- I do have some strong views concerning in how much 
detail detail our position favoring a preemption position should 
be set forth. I do not think it wise that we advance a 
substantive position with respect to each of the areas as to 
which we recommend federal preemption. To be sure, it is 
important to indicate the general subjects as to which we 
recommend preemption in order to cut off claims that we are 
proposing a full scale federal displacement of state corporate 
law. However, that concern can be met by detailing the general 
areas of concern -- ~~ differential voting rights, poison 
pills, second-step transactions -- without taking a position on 
how each issue should be treated in federal legislation. 
A number of points counsel in favor of such self-restraint. 
First, on a substantive level, the empirical and legal literature 
on each aspect of takeover regulation is voluminous. A review of 
that literature adequate to formulate and justify substantive 
positions (based on other than anecdote) would be an 
extraordinarily time consuming enterprise and, frankly, one that 
might well prove to be beyond the competence of a part-time 
commission. 
Second, expressing a substantive position on particular 
issues cannot help but divert attention from what is our most 
important point. With respect to substantive provisions, our 
position is but one of many that have been expressed by different 
groups in the course of Congressional hearings and reflected in 
one or another of the bills that have been introduced in 
Congress. California simply has no special position from which 
to assert particular substantive outcomes. Our unique position 
concerns preemption. It is a singular event for a state to 
advocate federal preemption of state law. That position 
deserves, and will get, attention unless we allow it to be 
diluted by debate on the particular terms of federal legislation. 
I do not suggest that, at the appropriate time, California not 
express its views on actual outcomes, but I do 
2~ at 1076-77. 
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think it ill advised at 
preemption with the merits 
resolved. 
the wisdom of 
issues should be 
Finally, I would resist preemption point with 
specific resolutions because to make it more 
difficult to garner support So long as the 
commission's only point is s and 
groups who may differ appropriate resolution 
of particular issues nonetheless can support preemption. 
Because broad support for the Commission's position on preemption 
is politically critical, I would no~hing that made it more 
difficult for anyone to sign on. 
In short, I urge that 
recommend preemption with 
areas. We should not, at 
outcomes with respect 
I apologize in advance 
RJG: jd 
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do no more than 
subject matter 
, recommend particular 
ect matters. 
next week's meeting. 
Best regards, 
~L)J>«.J.-~_; 
Ronald J'"' Gilson:::?'"' 
Professor of Law 
Michael J. Halloran, 
Pillsbury, Madison & 
225 Bush Street 
san Francisco, CA 94120 
19 a 
Re: Your memorandum dated February 2, 1988 to the 
Subcommittee on the Senate Commission 
on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and 
Securities Transactions 
Dear Michael: 
The subcommittee time on the pro-
posed resolution. , with no enthusiasm 
that I write this . However, I do feel that I must ex-
press myself. I have very carefully read the proposed resolution 
and have given it considerable thought. As a result, I have 
concluded that I cannot proposed resolution. 
Extreme care must be 
to the Federal Government. 
into Federal law would be 
of corporation law. Once 
taken abdication of local control 
tem, it 
change. on balance, 
interests of Cali 
Each area of the 
numerous competing 
case. To be complete, 
into account. The Cal 
duce the same degree of 
recently experienced 
we would be taking a 
delegation. On the 
sional or 
tional level, there 





Casting the proposed resolution 
first towards federalization 




considered in each 
these interests 
will not pro-
some these issues have 
Accordingly, I do not think 
product our congressional 
whether congres-
considered at the na-
thoroughly 
finer points and 
was re-
Wall Street 
Michael J. Halloran Esq. 
February 17, 1988 
Page 2 
Journal. I received several calls from people who read it. The 
gist of the message was that they would resent an attempt to 
legislate California's views of corporate law/morality on them. 
The resolution may impress the California delegation but proba-
bly would be considered an affront by those of other states. 
Passage of the resolution will obviously require expenditure of 
public resources. I am of the opinion that those resources 
could be better spent on pursuits that will have a greater range 
of support at the level of final action. 
By a copy of this letter to Senator McCorquodale, I am ask-
ing that he record my opposition to the proposed resolution in 
its present form or as may be modified when it comes up for con-
sideration next Friday. Unfortunately, I have a previous com-
mitment for February 26. If it were not for that conflict, I 
would attend and personally cast my vote in opposition. 
Very truly yours, 
RJS:mas 




STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TAKEOVERS: AN ECONOMIC VIEW 
BY JOHN POUND 
I. Introduction 
In 1987, more than a zen states s new legislation designed 
to change the environment in which hostile takeovers occur. While 
state activism on the takeover issue has been building steadily 
since 1985, the developments of 1987 were unprecedented. As the 
year closed, Delaware which had previously refrained from promul-
gating new takeover re tions, also came forward with signifi-
cant new legislative proposals. This action virtually ensures 
that other states, which have until now remained on the sidelines, 
will be compelled to offer new takeover initiatives. This docu-
ment discusses the economic structure of recent state plans, their 
potential effects on shareholders and corporations, and their 
efficiency consequences for the states and the national economy. 
II. Types of Laws 
Two primary types of antitakeover statutes have been introduced 
and passed by states since 1985. A first type sets direct terms 
and conditions under which business combinations may take place. 
Examples are the New York State law, and the proposed Delaware 
law. Typically, these statutes place explicit limits on the actions 
of an outside shareholder who acquires controlling interest in a 
target firm against the wishes of directors. The laws explicitly 
forbid such hostile acquirers from taking further actions for a 
specified period after the control position has been achieved. The 
New York law forbids the controlling shareholder from consolidating 
a merger with the target, selling assets, or otherwise restructuring 
the target firm for five years from date acquisition. The 
proposed Delaware statute conta s s ar restr effective 
for three years after controll interest is 
The second type of recent statute s voting structure of 
the target firm. The laws re voting rights of share-
holders who acquire 1 corporations' stock over 
the explicit objection target firm's management. When the 
outside shareholder crosses a ied ownership threshold without 
management permission, the attached to the acquired 
block of shares are revoked. can only reinstated by a 
majority vote of "disinterested" shares, defined as shares that 
are not owned by either large stockhol or current management. 
The ownership thresholds specified most statutes (including 
those of Massachusetts, , and Oh ) are 20%, 33%, and 50% 
of outstanding common shares. 
John Pound is an Assistant Professor Public Policy at the J.F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and is Director 
of the Corporate Voting Re Project. 
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Both types of laws have generally contained novel legal features 
relative to the first-generation state statutes that were struck 
down by the Supreme Court in the late 1970's. Among these are the 
"opt out" and "opt " clauses ity to state 
and out-of-state corporations , laws are structured 
so that corporations residing the state are automatically 
covered unless management proposes and shareholders vote to "opt 
out" of the new terms in favor of some other set of rules. Most 
laws are also structured so as to allow out-of-state firms with 
a substantial asset base in the state to "opt in" to the protec-
tions and structure of the statute. Out-of-state firms may gener-
ally become covered by the statute upon an affirmative vote of their 
shareholders. 
III. The Economic Effects of the New State Antitakeover Statutes 
The two new types of antitakeover statutes are often supported with 
detailed arguments about their effects on the structure of the take-
over market. However, both types of laws also have common, broad 
effects on shareholders, management, corporate structure, and state 
and national economic efficiency. This section summarizes both the 
broad and the spec ic effects of the laws. 
A. The Balance of Power Between Shareholders and Management 
The fundamental effect of all the new state takeover statutes is 
to vest more power in the hands of management and the board of 
directors of public corporations. Under the new laws, management 
of a target firm faced with a takeover attempt has a broad-based 
veto power over the ability of the bidding f to proceed with 
the takeover attempt. Under the New York type of statute, the 
veto power is absolute: a takeover transaction simply may not go 
forward without management consent. the Indiana-style law, 
a takeover is made more difficult. Without management consent, the 
outside shareholder must plan and execute an offer whose success 
is more costly and more uncertain than in the law's absence. 
Both of these types statutes thus shift the balance of power in 
the corporate control arena towards management. Shareholders either 
are prevented (under the New York law) or discouraged (under the 
Indiana law) from transferring control of the corporation over 
the objections of the Board of Directors. This creates additional 
deterrence in the takeover market. Faced with the prospect of a 
management veto, potential bidders may refrain from making invest-
ments in target corporations, or takeover bids against these cor-
porations. A number of bids that would have been profitable under 
the old laws will be unprofitable given the uncertainty and potential 
costs associated with the new statutes. 
B. The Effects of Deterrence on Takeover Activity 
The new state laws will definitely make hostile takeovers more 
difficult to accomplish in the forseeable future. It is difficult 
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times, in particular, gave 
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ss. Minimum offer 
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Yet the liams 
in that 
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state laws will have a 
Jarrell and Bradley 
federal takeover reg-
Additional evidence on the potential fects of the new 
state laws comes from recent literature on the effects of antitake-
over provisions on takeover activity. Two recent studies have 
examined how firm-specif antitakeover amendments, that vest more 
power with target management, feet takeover frequency and share-
holder wealth. Pound (1987) effects of so-called fair 
price and supermajority antitakeover amendments on takeover activity. 
He finds that these amendments s ificantly decrease the frequency 
of takeover bids, while not el gains in those 
takeovers that do occur. He also finds some evidence that manage-
ment uses these amendments for their own protection and gain when 
faced with unwanted 1987) finds a similar effect 
associated with so-call pill enses. He finds 
that 1 plans sign frequency of successful 
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State , by contrast, 
th ta 
active steps to resist 
that is supposed to act 
power. 
Available evidence on 
on takeover b is 
evidence does exist that 
from the amendments. In 
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some iminary 
new deterrent effect 
takeover 
1987) note two 
takeover b were by the 
imposition of new state laws. This is significant evidence, 
showing that the new laws have spec ic takeover 
bids unprofitab were e undertakings. 
, a recent SEC study 
passage caused significant to 
corporations (Ryngaert and Netter, 1987). 
sistent with a deterrent effect. 
C Deterrence and Corporate Investment 
is is once again con-
The deterrent effects of the new state statutes will also extend 
to a second realm: large investments by active shareholders in 
corporations will be reduced. Large investments in major corpor-
ations are documented to have salutary effects for shareholders 
and the efficiency of the corporation. Large investors serve sev-
eral important economic purposes even they never launch takeover 
bids against firms or otherwise attempt to gain control. First, 
they have an economic incentive to act as monitors, assessing 
managerial performance more closely than do small, dispersed share-
holders. Second, they have sufficient power to negotiate with 
management when problems arise either with managerial performance, 
or with apparent conflicts of interest within the corporation. 
Large shareholders are not always welcomed by management as these 
roles tend to reduce managerial discretion. But they are important 
influences on corporate efficiency. 
Several theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate the salutary 
effects of large shareholders on 1 incentives, corporate 
efficiency, and shareholder wealth. and Vishny (1986) 
present an analysis of the potential iciency gains that large 
investors bring to the corporate environment, and show that it is 
large. Ruback and Mikkelson (1986) and Holderness and Sheehan 
(1986) document empirically that investors acquiring more than five 
ownership in large corporations increase value and economic 
They show that is is true even in the absense of a 
takeover bid. Holderness and Sheehan (1985, 1987) fur-
ther document that large investors -- including majority investors 
are not passive participants in the corporation. Rather, they 
generally use their power expertise to suggest strategic and 
structural changes to management in order to increase corporate per-
formance. 
New state antitakeover laws will decrease the frequency with which 
investors take these types of large positions in major corporations 
for several reasons. First, under the Indiana law, accumulation 
of a significant position leads to the loss of voting power -- to 
disenfranchisement -- and thus negates the power of the large share-
holder to monitor the corporation and effect change. Second, both 
types of laws severely restrict the large investors' ultimate 
courses of action, should management be unresponsive in the future 
to suggestions for change. Large investors assume substantial risk 
by purchasing large stakes in the corporation, and one compensation 
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for as is b d 
manager l performance degree 
that the new state s ility, they leave 
large investors with no recourse should managerial quality deter-
iorate and adversely affect their investment. 
D. Effects of State Statutes on tivity 
A major argument advanced by some proponents of new state legis-
lation is that by deterring takeovers, these new laws will increase 
the productivity of corporations and thereby aid in economic 
growth. Several arguments are made. F st, is argued that the 
threat of takeovers forces to focus on short-term perfor-
mance in order to keep stock prices , thus deters produc-
tive investment in plants, equipment, and research and development. 
Second, it is argued that takeovers often occur against health cor-
porations, and cause social and economic dislocation including 
plant closures and job losses. 
In the past three years, both of these arguments have been refuted 
by a large body of empirical research. Generally, the research 
shows that on average, takeovers are productivity-increasing, and 
are undertaken against firms whose performance has fallen signifi-
cantly below par. Moreover, evidence shows that takeovers are 
most often launched against f that are laggards in making pro-
ductive investments in plants, R & D, and productivity. 
Several studies have examined the argument that takeovers prevent 
firms from making productive stments. Lehn and Jarrell (1985) 
and Pound, Lehn, and Jarrell (1986) examine the characteristics of 
targets of hostile takeovers compared to variety of groups of 
"control" firms. The authors find that hostile takeover targets 
are generally characterized by lower levels of investment in re-
and are peers. They also 
find that hostile targets are lower capital ex-
penditures per share. s, the reduce 
profitable investment appears to If anything, the 
reverse is the case: takeovers occur are failing to 
make the investments needed to stay 
Several other, more recent whether takeover 
targets tend to be worse or than other firms at 
the time of the contest. s find that targets 
are characteriz by decl performance, measured 
by a wide variety of economic Martin, Loderer, and 
McConnell (1987) find t to be character-
ized by a long history of e relative to firms 
in the same industry. Morek, Vishny (1987) find 
that targets tend to be characterized by low performance, as measured 
by whether assets are being ut ized as efficiently as they could 
be in the pre-takeover These f takeovers 
to be productivity-enhanc 
-24-
Martin, Loderer, and McConnell also sent evidence 
suggesting that post-takeover changes in targets' internal organ-
ization are related to their pre-takeover performance. Specifically, 
they find that top management to after takeovers, in 
targets whose pre-takeover performance was decl ing. In contrast, 
little management change is found those targets whose pre-take-
over performance is at or above industry norms. This suggests that 
management changes occur when takeovers are aimed at improving an 
under-performing firm. The evidence also shows that some takeovers 
occur for "synergistic" reasons, in which two healthy firms find 
mutual efficiency benefits from entering into a business combin-
ation. In these cases there is no "punitive" effect on target 
management as a result of the takeover. 
The evidence on job loss from takeovers is more preliminary than 
are the foregoing results, but militates in the same direction. 
Measuring takeovers' effects on job loss presents difficult metho-
dological problems. But existing studies (Medoff, 1986) show that 
takeovers do not result in more job loss. Some plant closings and 
other economic adjustments are more vivid in the presence of take-
overs, as public attention is drawn by the takeover transaction 
itself. But far more job loss occurs as a matter of normal business 
practice in firms and industries not characterized by takeover 
activity. 
Overall, the new state takeover statutes cannot be supported on the 
premise that by deterring takeovers, they will increase the eco-
nomic productivity of job base in the state or the nation as a 
who Indeed existing evidence suggests that if anything, precisely 
the opposite will be the case. By firms from the n~~d 
to be respons to stors, the new state laws are likely to 
make firms slower to adapt to change in world and national markets. 
This will protect organized vested interests -- both current manage-
ment and current workers -- but will not help either the consumers, 
the labor force, or managers taken as a whole. 
E. Effects on Management Incentives 
The new state laws create a perverse combination of changes for 
corporate managements, which are likely to be inimicable to their 
interests in the long run. First, they insulate managements from 
having to make active decisions about whether to defend against 
some takeover bids. Second, and concurrently, they set up rigid 
new limits to managerial discretion that may tie managers' hands 
in the longer term. 
Prior to the generation of state laws, a management wishing to resist 
a takeover bid had to expend significant costs -- reputational and 
resource costs -- in order to accomplish its goal. Lawsuits were 
a common form of takeover defense designed to force bidders to 
withdraw their unwanted bids by imposing additional costs on the 
process (Jarrell, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1987). More recently, many 
managements have engaged in restructuring of corporations in order 
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to ward off ho le b 
Poulsen, and Jarrell, 
may s be 
them. But under 
had to make active decis 
imposed sign icant costs 
s, managements 
defensive strategy that 
The need to make such an s numerous bene-
fits relative to the new state 
laws. First, managers must signal to the market, by active decision, 
their opinion about the current b s information to 
the market about the motives and qual management and the value 
of the firm. Several studies management's de-
fensive commitments convey s important information 
to the market (Pound, 1987; Vishny, 1986; Jarrell, 
1985). Shareholders learn about the motives and effectiveness of 
formation to isolate particularly good or bad managements, and 
in assessing the profitability particular takeover bids. 
Second, by deterring some bids , new state laws 
also deprive shareholders of about the 
potential value of their firm. Many studies have shown that take-
over bids convey signif informat to the market about firm 
value (Bhagat, Brickley, and Lowenstein, 1987; Pound, 1987; Bradley, 
Desai, and Kim, 1983; Bradley, 1980). the new state 
statutes, more bids would occur. Some of them would prove too 
low, and therefore be defeated by managements' discretionary 
defensive actions. But the mere of a bid informs share-
holders about the value that an outs investor places 
on the firm's assets. With the new state statutes some of the in-
formational effect is lost along with deterred takeover bids. 
Ultimately, managers may find the lack of flex that is im-
plied by the new state statutes to 
The laws remove from 
scretion ass 
and reacting to 
Corporate management is 
options are limited on 
-- and thus explic 
imposition of blanket 
in the long run, to 
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in as a group with a potential acquirer. Faced with a bid, 
no individual shareholder feels any power to prevent the bid from 
being successful by not tendering his shares. Moreover, share-
may bel that by not tendering, they will lose the 
, wh e having no deterrent effect on the bid. Thus 
s may tender into offers that they do not in fact 
want to accept, because they have no alternative. 
This problem has been argued to create a need to vest more power 
management to block takeover bids. Proponents of new state 
statutes (and other antitakeover devices) argue that an empowered 
management can represent the interests of shareholders and deter 
bids that shareholders would prefer not to accept. The New York 
style laws accomplish this by preventing a hostile acquirer from 
fecting a business combination at all without the formal approval 
of management. The Indiana style laws accomplish this by forcing 
large shareholder who violates management dictates to seek 
voting enfranchisement from other shareholders. The idea in this 
case is that outside shareholders should have the right to decide 
whether they want to confer voting power -- and some element of 
control -- to large shareholder, independent of each individual 
shareholder's dec ion whether to sell shares. 
There are three problems with using this reasoning to justify the 
new state statutes. The first problem is that a matter of law, the 
coercion problem should be precluded by existing state corporate 
codes. Delaware and most other state codes explicitly prevent a 
majority shareholder, or any group of shareholders acting as a 
majority, from taking any action that would expropriate the minority. 
This prevents any successful bidder from expropriating the wealth 
of non-tendering, minority shareholders. If the successful bidder 
(and now controlling owner) cannot expropriate the wealth of non-
tendering shareholders, then there can be no significant coercion, 
because there are no costs from refusing to tender into an inadequate 
offer. Shareholders are only coerced if they believe that by re-
fusing to tender into offers that are inadequate, they may lose 
wealth because control will be transferred and they will be denied 
the tender offer premium. 
The second reason that the coercion argument cannot be used to 
support the new state statutes is empirical. A large body of 
existing evidence provides evidence that coercion does not appear 
to be a major problem in most takeover contests. Specifically, 
the literature shows that there is in fact no loss from refusing 
to tender into an offer (Bradley, 1980). Comment and Jarrell (1987) 
also measure directly whether offers that are structured so as to 
be potentially coercive -- particularly partial and two-tier tender 
offers -- expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. They 
provide evidence that all shareholders -- including non-tendering 
shareholders -- gain substantially even in two-tier tender offers. 
This evidence makes the coercion argument even harder to sustain, 
by showing that potentially coercive tender offer instruments have 
not typically been coercive in practice. 
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It is likely that the two new types of state statutues represented 
by the New York and Indiana lead to a worse economic solution 
than would occur with no additional shareholder protection at all. 
The New York law gives management enormous power to veto all bids, 
even in cases where a majority of shareholders would approve an 
acquisition. This power is not in any way to shareholders' 
preferences. This clearly does not directly address the coercion 
problem, but rather creates a tial huge new problem based 
on conflict of interest and management interests. 
The Indiana law creates a more perhaps more troubling 
set of problems. The Indiana law rs to correct the coercion 
problem by giving shareholders a vote to give control 
to a ho e acqu The under this and similar 
statutes, the wrong right to vote. 
Bebchuck's analysis shows be taken by all 
shareholders. The Ind , contrast, s this vote only 
to shareholders who have not tendered the shares to the potential 
acquirer. 
The Ind 
Under the law, 
a takeover attempt are 
least likely to support 
makes a bid for all shares 
that this bid results 
Under the Indiana law, 
right to vote on 
def 
who believed that $20 per 
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losing the takeover premium should the offer go through. But con-
currently, each shareholder may express his "true" feelings about the 
of the offer. offer is allowed to proceed if it 
receives a majority votes, ess of how many 
reholders tender. This -- and not the New York or Indiana-style 
-- is the correct approach to dealing with the coerc 
G. The New State Laws and the Structure of Corporate Governance. 
In addition to their direct effects on takeover activity, corporate 
investment, corporate productivity, and shareholder choice, the new 
state antitakeover laws also contain fundamental and adverse impli-
cations for the role of shareholder voting in corporate oversight. 
The laws adversely affect both the structure of shareholders' voting 
rights, and to the use of proxy voting system as a vehicle for 
overseeing management. 
New York law, restricting all takeover activity not approved by 
target management, effectively revokes completely the right of share-
hal to dec about a fundamental -- indeed the fundamental --
aspect corporate structure and control. By preventing takeovers, 
the New York law also puts new pressure on the proxy voting system. 
Under the law, the only strategic option open to an acquirer facing 
a hostile target management is to launch a proxy contest. Proxy con-
tests have long been thought to be a very inefficient means of gaining 
corporate control and influencing corporate management, due to problems 
in structure of the proxy voting system. Recent evidence has begun 
to document inefficienc in the proxy voting system, including a 
significant pro-management bias in proxy voting laws and behavior 
(Pound, 1988a,bi Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1987; Heard and Sherman, 
1987). To the degree that the New York law forces bidders into use 
of proxy fights, it introduces more stress into an already poorly 
performing voting process, and introduces new costs and inefficiencies 
into the process of corporate control. 
The Indiana law mirrors and extends these adverse consequences for 
the structure of shareholder voting. First, the law breaks with 
virtually all state tradition in corporate law by departing from 
neutrality in the allocation of voting rights among common stock-
holders. The law's specific, arbitrary revocation of voting rights 
associated with large shareholdings opens the door to further manipu-
lations of voting rights law, with detrimental implications for the 
stability of corporate oversight and corporate structure. Moreover, 
the Indiana law potentially creates a legal conflict between federal 
exchange listing standards and the voting rights provisions of state 
law. Voting rights listing standards are moving, under the current 
SEC, towards a universal one-share, one-vote requirement. Any cor-
poration covered by an Indiana-style law is by definition in violation 
of this standard. This could lead to a major conflict between state 
and federal jurisdiction in the voting rights arena. 
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L the New York law, sis, 
and new stress, on the voting. As is 
true under the New York statute, scourage outside 
shareholders from launch instead lead them 
to launch proxy contests. , a potential 
acquirer facing a reca mount a proxy chal-
lenge to avoid trigger ranchisernent" threshold at 
which his shares lose power. But more important, and 
unlike the New York style statutes, the Indiana law also effectively 
creates proxy contests whenever a shareholder does indeed choose 
to cross the ownership threshold -- either to a tender offer, 
or simply due to acquiring a large stake target corporation. 
This is because the law s s to vote to ide 
whether large shareholders d be ent to vote. To the 
degree that the proxy voting system inefficient and even biased 
toward management, this puts stress on the voting system and creates 
significant additional costs. 
Thus, both the Indiana and New York style statutes place direct 
stress on the system of shareholder voting in addition to the costs 
they create by deterring takeovers and active corporate investment. 
Both laws force more takeover conflicts to resolved through the 
voting system directly. Empirical ev e suggests that this 
system is, under current laws and regulations, probably the least 
;._.li-.l.IL:nk,dnsh-ttrc:m::;l ncJ Ci l fc es~rt cor-
porate policy. Indeed were this not the case, proxy contests would 
be used by potent more , stead of more costly 
offer acquis ers. Forcing more governance conflicts 
into the proxy voting system is 1 to create significant legal 
and economic problems, and further weaken the effectiveness of 
shareholder oversight. 
In short term, states 
lation should probably wa 
pursuing new 
it is important to recogni e 
are alternat s states 
of corporate control that 
either the New York or 
section briefly reviews several 
A. Let Corporations and 
s le policy formu-








The most obvious, and t response from states 
to the takeover question is to recognize that corporations and share-
holders should be free to set their own protections and guarantees 
in the area of corporate control. In the past few years, most major 
changes in the structure of t secure as much 
or more protection from s than do either 
of the new types of state antitakeover laws. Examples are super-
majority amendments, classified board amendments, and dual-class 
recapitalization schemes. Dual c lizations are in 
fact a more s if current state 
law, as they effectively remove from outs ders the right 
to vote on all important decisions relating to corporate control. 
al free to make types of changes under 
states, evidence shows that they use this 
produce a wide variety of results. Some corporations 
relatively unprotected, while others have revoked all power 
from outside shareholders. This evidence both suggests that there 
is no need for sweeping statewide changes in corporate law. Indi-
vidual corporations can and do set their own processes and protections 
as a part of the contract between shareholders and management. 
This does not imply that there is no further role for changes in 
state takeover laws. Rather, it suggests that one appropriate 
focus for new policy should be on making sure that the solution 
arrived at in each corporation is in fact efficient and reflective 
of shareholder and management preferences. For example, state laws 
could give outside shareholders the explicit right to make proposals 
for new charter changes, or the rescission of old charter provisions, 
on the management proxy. This would reduce the costs of negotiation 
between shareholders and management. State laws could also require 
that corporations disclose annually the structure of their corporate 
charter to shareholders. Currently, this information is provided 
only when a significant charter change is proposed. At other times, 
it is often difficult or impossible for outside shareholders to 
determine the current structure of the corporate charter in matters 
relating to corporate governance and corporate control. 
One important policy approach is thus to encourage corporation-
spec ic solutions to the takeover problem. This approach encourages 
ficiency to the degree that shareholder voting actually serves 
to reflect shareholder preferences. While recent evidence raises 
concerns about the efficiency of the voting process, voting in 
individual corporations is certainly a preferable alternative to 
sweeping policy changes at the state level. 
B. Adopt the "Vote and Tender" Solution 
A simple and direct policy change, that directly addresses possible 
ficiencies in the takeover process, is suggested by Bebchuck's 
analys of the coercion problem in hostile takeovers. The change 
would require that shareholders vote on tender offers at the same 
that they tender. This law, as argued in Section III.E., 
directly addresses a potential distortion that may exist in the 
tendering decision. The Indiana and New York style takeover laws 
claim to address this problem but in fact fail to do so. As argued 
in Section III.E., adopting the vote-and-tender rule would improve 
the efficiency of the takeover process, and give shareholders a 
better voice in takeover decisions, without imposing large new costs 
on the system. A variant of this policy currently governs control 
transactions under British law. 
c. Merit Regulation of Takeover Activity 
There may be some takeover bids that carry significant adverse 
consequences for particular states' economies, workforces, taxpayers, 
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or natural resources. 
several of these Some of these 
types of takeovers external costs -- that is, 
costs not borne by or the target firm -- and thus 
cause genuine efficiency concerns. It is reasonable to ask how 
states should deal with spec takeover bids that fall into this 
category. 
A first response is that the structure of state government creates 
a mechanism that reacts to specific and problematic takeovers. 
Several states have actively intervened to slow or stop particular 
takeover transactions over the past year. The impetus for such 
action usually comes from ac state legislature. 
An important question for policy is whether a more formal channel 
for reviewing problematic, specific takeover transactions should 
exist. There are arguments in favor of such a system. Leaving 
such authority to de facto operation of the legislative system may 
be a very imperfect and costly way of identifying genuinely problematic 
takeover bids. The current system may prevent some bids from 
proceeding that are in fact efficient, while failing to stop some 
bids that are in fact problematic. 
~t would be a dangerous precedent to create formal state review of 
individual takeover transactions without careful consideration of 
whether such a system could function effectively and free from bias 
and political influence. Such a system might also be viewed as 
unconstitutional. But it is also possible that some process of state 
review, and the enunciation by states of specific problems that might 
cause the review process to be invoked, might be a preferable approach 
to dealing with specific, problematic takeovers than are either 
sweeping new state takeover restrictions, or the current ad-hoc 
legislative process. 
D. Utilize Exi 1 
Finally, it is ortant not exist-
ing federal authorities the 
takeover arena. The Department of Just the Federal Trade 
commission are charged wi preventing ss combinations that 
could lead to excess market power. ss combinations in 
many industries must be approved one or more federal authori-
ties (for example, communications power generation). These 
authorities should ensure cer economic inefficiencies 
could result from some ci takeover bids do not occur. 
State vigilance, and active eration with these federal 
authorities, can help to litate against particular inefficient 
takeover transactions. However, states should also resist the 
temptation to induce federal ities to impose costs on the 
vast majority of efficient takeover transactions, even if these 
transactions are unpopular with certain vested interests. 
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WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS FOR THE STATE UNDER CTS? 
BY SUSAN HENRICHSEN 
LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAKEOVER LAWS 
Introduction 
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Supreme Court 
declared an Illinois statute regulating tender offers unconstitutional 
on commerce clause grounds. Subsequently, lower courts struck down 
a number of state laws regulating takeovers. The states, turn, 
attempted to find new approaches and many states passed so-called 
"second-generation" takeover 
In April, 1987, the Court reached a very different conclusion with 
respect to one of the "second-generation" laws. In CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, 95 L.Ed. 67 (1987), the Court upheld 
Indiana's Control Share Acqu Act aga st both commerce clause 
and supremacy clause chall s. e that decision, still more 
states have passed takeover laws; a majority of the states now have 
such provisions. 
The Edgar v. MITE Case 
The Supreme Court in , 457 U.S. 624 {1982), 
struck down an Illino s statute regu takeovers. The only 
thing a majority of the justices agreed was that the Illinois 
law violated the commerce clause. F (Justices Burger, 
White, Stevens, O'Connor and 1) this conclusion, while 
three (Justices Burger, B ) determined the Illinois 
law was preempted by the Act, a federal law regulating 
tender offers. Three justices (Justices Marshall, Brennan and 
Rehnquist) found the case moot and consequently said nothing at all 
about the substantive issues. 
Although the majority opinion ssed preemption, only three 
justices found the Illino law was preempted by the Williams Act. 
This conclusion of Justices Wh and Blackmun (the plurality) 
was based on the finding Illinois law frustrated the 
purposes of the Williams Act. The plurality concluded the Congres-
sional aim was neutral as between the bidder and incumbent manage-
ment. Since the Williams Act struck a balance between the interests 
of the offeror and the target corporation, any state law that upset 
this balance would be preempted. Id. at 632-634. 
Susan Henrichsen is Deputy 
California. 
General for the State of 
s s in particular in Illinois statute gave offense. 
Illinois law provided for a 20-day pre~cornmencement period, 
filing a r~g1stration statement the Illinois 
State and commencement of the fer. During 
iod, the feror could not discuss terms of the offer, 
management the target corporation would be.free to 
voice ir views. Second, the statute provided for a hearing 
on a tender offer, without providing a deadline within which the 
hear must be held, raising the possibility of an indefinite 
delay in the tender offer. Finally, the substantive fairness of 
the tender offer was to be reviewed by the Illinois Secretary of 
State; the plurality concluded Congress had intended that share-
holders be free to make the own decisions. Id., at 639-640. 
The CTS Case 
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 95 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987) 
involved a different statute, drafted to avoid the defects of the 
Illinois law, and a very different result. In CTS, Indiana's 
Control Share Acquisition Act was upheld against both commerce 
clause and supremacy clause challenges. 
The Indiana law provides that "control shares" in an "issuing public 
corporation" will not have voting rights unless such rights are 
granted by a vote of the majority of the disinterested shareholders 
at the next regular shareholders' meeting. The person holding 
such shares can require a special meeting to be held within 50 days 
if he or she files an "acquiring person statement," requests the 
meeting and agrees to pay the expenses of the meeting. 
The Indiana law applies to any corporation incorporated 
unless 
of 
corporation amends its articles or bylaws to 
Act. The law applies only to an "issuing public 
defined as an Indiana corporation with: 




2) its incipal office or substantial assets in Indiana; and 
3) either: 
a) more than ten percent of its shareholders in Indiana; 
b) more than ten percent of its shares owned by Indiana 
residents; or 
c) at least ten thousand shareholders in Indiana. 
A "control share" is defined as a share that, but for the provisions 
of the act, would provide voting power equal to or greater than 
any of three thresholds: 20 percent, 33 1/3 percent, or 50 percent. 
The effect of the Indiana law is that a person acquiring 20 percent 
or more of the voting power of an Indiana corporation that meets 
the "issuing public corporation" definition has no voting power 
unless such power is granted by a vote of the disinterested share-
holders. 
Distric 
11 t and 
Court of Appeals a 
ing that the Indiana statute 
of the purpose of the Wil 
on interstate commerce was 
"defining the attributes o 
protecting shareholders " 
Crucial to the Court's decis 
of the Indiana law was "to 
corporations, 11 a purpose accomplished 
to determine collectively 
is e. Id. at 86. 
commerce clause, the 
rever , conclud-
the provisions 
s limited effect 
's interest in 
s corporations and in 
finding that the purpose 
ders of Indiana 
by allowing the shareholders 
change control 
In its preemption analysis, the Court noted that although it was 
not bound by the MITE plurality, 11 the Indiana Act passes muster 
even under [that] broad interpretation of the Williams Act." 
Unlike the Illinois law that may have operated to favor management 
over bidders, the Indiana statute protects independent shareholders 
aga st both those parties. placing investors on an equal 
footing with the bidder, the Indiana law promotes one of the purposes 
of the Williams Act. Id. at 80. 
The law's stated purpose of ting shareholders was also 
essential to the Court's commerce clause analysis. The Court 
noted thab the creation of corporations is a matter of state. law 
as is the definition of the rights acquired by purchasers of a 
corporation's shares. The Indiana law, in defining or restricting 
voting rights, for the legitimate purpose of protecting independent 
shareholders, was within the state's traditional power and province. 
Id. at 8 6. 
In contrast , the Court in CTS expressed 
no devotion to a corporate 
control unfettered state the latter 
case was not concerned with takeovers. Other than a 
erence to the potent lly coerc feet of some takeovers, 
the Court's discussion of their value is largely limited to a 
footnote, ob that " and ity of tender offers 
vary widely. 11 __ • at 87, . 13. 
F , unlike the MITE CTS is seemingly 
unconcerned over the of the Indiana law 
on tender offers. While c a lack evidence for the claim 
that the Act will limit successful tender offers, the 
Court nevertheless concedes Act will 1 deter such offers 
to some degree. . at 81, 88. s result, however, 
alters neither the-preemption nor the commerce clause analysis, as 
both the mechanism and the purpose of the Act are within the state's 
traditional powers and sts of prescrib the attributes of 
shares in its corporations shareholders. Ibid. 
Existing State Laws 
In structuring a state law, ipal issues must 
be ssed and substantive provisions of the law, 
corporations to which shall apply, and the control 
transactions that shall trigger the law's provisions. State laws 
currently in effect have resolved these issues in different ways. 
Although state takeover laws differ somewhat in their definitions 
and application, in general such laws impose specified requirements 
or restrictions on an "acquiring person," defined as one who 
acquires in excess of a specified threshold level of a target 
corporation's voting stock. The substantive provisions of such 
laws are generally drawn from one or more of four principal 
approaches, discussed below. 
Indiana'a law is typical of the "control-share" approach. Such a 
law provides an acquiring person's shares shall not have voting 
power unless such power is conferred by a vote of the .shareholders. 
The "business combination 11 or "freeze-out" law regulates specified 
business combinations between a corporation and an acquiring 
person. In general, such laws prohibit business combinations such 
as mergers, liquidation or sale of assets for five years after an 
unfriendly takeover. 
The "fair price" law is probably the most common, either alone or 
in conjunction with one of the other approaches. Such a law 
protects shareholders who are bought out in the second state of a 
two-tiered tender offer by requiring payment of a "fair price" to 
those remaining shareholders, unless the shareholders or board of 
directors vote otherwise. 
The least common approach the "control-share cash-out 11 law. 
Such a law requires a person who exceeds a specified ownership 
threshold to purchase any shareholder's shares, upon demand. 
The second issue to be dealt with is the definition of the "target 
corporation;" that is, the corporation which is the subject of the 
takeover or tender offer. Two criteria employed by most current 
state takeover laws are the corporation's place of incorporation 
and its economic ties to the state. 
Most states have applied their laws only to "domestic" corporations 
-- those incorporated in the state. At least five states, however, 
including Arizona, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina and 
Washington, have enacted takeover laws that also apply to out-of-
state corporations with a substantial economic presence in the state. 
Those laws generally apply only to those out-of-state corporations 
that have substantial assets, a significant number of shareholders, 
and their principal office or primary place of business in the state. 
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generally inc some 
Indiana , example 
have their principal f 
that have more than 10 
more than 10 percent of the 
or at least 10,000 sharehol 
The final issue is the 
transactions shall trigger 
this has simply been a question 
of voting power. The law's 
person or entity acquires 
corporation's voting stock. 
the Indiana law, if fairly coromon. 
corporations 
ia as 1. The 
corporations that 
assets in Indiana and 
in Indiana, 
Indiana residents, 
s or control 




20 percent, used in 
Validity of Current State Laws Under CTS 
MITE provides some guidance as to what states may not do, while 
CTS sets forth some guidel s for what states may do. Clearly, a 
statute of the type struck down MITE, ich directly regulates 
tender offers by submitting to ite delays and allowing 
state icials to prevent such an from going forward, goes 
too far. 
The law upheld in CTS was cast in a completely different light. 
The Court characterized that as one defining the attributes of 
shares in a states' corporat s, and compared it to other statutes 
of unquestioned validity which also affect voting rights and 
changes in control, such as provisions classified boards or 
cumulative voting. The purpose of the law was one legitimately 
within a state's shareholder protection. 
Of the four types 
control-share acquis 
with some sha s 
such a statute may re 
tender offer, such a will 
long as the delay is not unrea 
consummation of a tender 
WilliamsAct, a not unreasonable 
America, supra, 95 L. .2d at 
obvious a 
stic corporations 
ss le. Even though 
consummation of a 
statute invalid, so 
Court in CTS found the 
60 maximum of the 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 
It also seems likely be upheld. Such 
laws clearly are for the lder protection and are 
specifically designed to al coercive 
aspects of tender of discus by the Court. Id. 
at 87. Furthermore, such are ess burdensome on 
interstate commerce than the control-share type statute. 
The validity of control-
the purpose is shareholder 
laws are rationally related 
Court would find such laws 
they favor neither bidder nor 
laws is less clear. Again, 
, and the provisions of such 
It seems unlikely the 
lliams Act, since 
promote the purpose 
of protecting independent shareho 
p a more significant burden on market 
control. Neverthless, under the reasoning of 
well be permissible. 
laws may, however, 
for corporate 
CTS, such laws might 
le scus here is 
s combination or freeze-out type statute. Such 
a law prohibits transactions as mergers or sa of assets 
between a corporation and an acquiring person for five years after 
acquisition unless the acquisition was approved by the board 
of directors. Unlike the approaches discussed above, this approach 
places a great deal of power in the hands of the target 
corporation's management, at the expense of both the bidder and 
the independent shareho It might therefore be struck down 
on preemption grounds. 
Although the business combination law deals with a subject matter 
that is commonly within the area of state regulation (that is, 
mergers and sale of assets), it does so in a manner that can hardly 
be characterized as promoting shareholder welfare or autonomy. The 
law permits a board of directors, by refusing to consent to an 
acquisition, to prevent an acquiring person from exercising control 
for five years and allows the independent shareholders no say in 
the matter whatsoever. Such a law might very well be vulnerable to 
a challenge on commerce clause grounds. 
These problems might be alleviated by eliminating any reference to 
approval of the initial acquisition by the board of directors and 
by providing that the prohibited transactions may take place upon 
approval of the independent shareholders. Such a change would 
maintain balance between the bidder and management and provide 
shareholder protection, making the law far less vulnerable to 
claims of preemption. 
a law would still be far more likely to deter tender offers 
the Indiana law upheld in CTS. An offeror under that law 
could know, prior to completing-a-tender offer, whether or nut its 
shares would have voting power. Under the business combination 
law, however, an acquiror would not know whether or not a 
transaction could be carried out until the transaction was 
proposed and put to a vote, long after the initial acquisition. 
Applicability of State Laws to Out-of-State Corporations 
most uncertain issue for states after CTS may well be the 
question of the permissible reach or jurisdiction of state 
laws. This is a complex subject, discussed only briefly 
here. 
The Illinois law struck down in MITE applied to out-of-state 
corporations, so long as the corporation had 10 percent of the 
class of securities subject to the tender offer owned by Illinois 
residents and had its principal office and at least 10 percent of 
its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois. The impact of 
the law on out-of-state corporations and thus on interstate 
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commerce was a 
It should be noted, 
Illinois law were probably 
dec ion; the Illinois 
even if it applied only to 
Illinois. 
down the law. 




The Indiana law applies to Indiana ions. The 
emphasis in CTS on a state's power to create corporations and to 
define the attributes of shares in corporations seems so 
fundamental to the Court's reasoning, there is little in CTS 
to support the proposition that state takeover laws may properry-
be applied to out-of-state corporations. 
A state takeover law appcl le to out-of-state corporations is 
vulnerable to attack on one of the most fundamental commerce 
clause grounds; namely, that adversely affects interstate 
commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations. 
The Massachusetts law may have avoided this pitfall by applying 
its law to out-of-state corporations only if their state of 
incorporation has no such law. If a state law sets economic 
criteria that can only be met in one state (e.g., applying the law 
assets or with their princ office in the state) and 
incorporates the Massachusetts provision as well, then only one 
state's law would apply. 
The benefits of a law applicable to out-of-state corporations 
would still have to outweigh its effects on interstate commerce. 
The Court in CTS found the Indiana law's effect on interstate 
commerce "justified by the State's interests in defining the 
attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting 
shareholders.'' Id. at 88. Although the first of these interests 
is missing where a law applies to out-of-state corporations, the 
second could still be present. Such a law is not likely to 
survive a commerce c significant 
portion of the are located 
in the state. 
Finally, the greater the and more s ficant the 
contacts of the out-of-state corporation with the state seeking 
to impose its law, the more 1 ly law would withstand 
constitutional challenge. It could be argued that the interest 
a state has in regulating s of a different nature, than 
its interest in the affa of an out-of-state corporation which 
is a substantial presence the state. A law may therefore be 
less likely to be struck down if includes such criteria as 
principal office and substantial assets, as well as significant 
numbers of shares of shareho , in state. 
v 
WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND OF REGULATION? 
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF DELAWARE INCORPORATIONS ON CALIFORNIA'S 
SOVEREIGNTY AND CORPORATE LAW? 
BY ROBERT MONKS AND WILLIAM LERACH 
Preemption is a term that technical refers to the explicit 
(or implicit) assertion by the federal government of jurisdiction 
in an area that had previously been left to action by the states. 
But in the case of corporate law, one state has de facto preempted 
the other forty-nine. California corporation law ·has in practical 
effect been "preempted" by Deleware. The second-smallest state 
geographically, Delaware is now "home" to the bulk of the Fortune 
500. The legal function of the law of corporations allows a company 
to have nothing more than a mail drop to designate Delaware as 
its domicile, thus permitting its insiders to take advantage of 
the many corporate protections and benefits that Delaware provides 
to corporate management and directors. This problem has been 
exacerbated in recent years as many of the largest companies 
previously organized under California law reincorporated in 
Delaware -- Potlatch, Occidental Petroleum, Times Mirror, Disney 
and Wells Fargo among them. The main physical presence of these 
companies remain in Californ Many, if not most, of their 
employees are California residents. The only difference is the 
legal fiction of filing some documents that transforms the company 
into a Delaware corporation. California is now the georgraphical 
domicile of a large number of the "Fortune 500" but the legal 
domicile of only three. 
There is no obligation that a corporation have any real connection 
with the state from which it receives its corporate charter; 
there is also no requirement that a corporation doing business 
in a particular state also be incorporated in that state. Thus, 
from the beginnings of .the existence of large corporations following 
the Civil War, the corporation of the various states have 
been involved in a "race to the bottom"l in order to attract 
the franchise tax revenues 1 iness resulting from 
being a desirable corporate haven. Under the Constitution, of 
course, each state is obl to g "full faith and credit" 
to the laws of the other states s e an action that is legal 
in one state, such as a of 16-year-olds, is valid in all 
Robert Monks is President o Ins tutional Shareholder Services, Inc., 
in Washington, D.C. He has served as the Director of the Federal 
Retirement Thrift Investor Board and as Administrator of the 
Department of Labors Office of Pension Welfare. 
William Lerach is partner the Law Firm of Milberg, Weiss, 
Bershad, Specthrie and Lerach San Diego, CA. Milberg Wiess has 
been actively engaged in cornmerc 1 litigation emphasizing securities 
and anti-trust class actions almost twenty years. 
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having an experienced 
are needs in 
a and rapid ic observers, 
, e itable business 
of selling its special law2 -- which 
is uniformly attract , and the corpor-
ations themselves at of shareholders nationwide.3 
This includes recent continued Delaware's 
decades-long history of accomodating corporate interests: 
corporations can now el s' 1 lity in cases of 
negligent breaches of duty. In another step 
backward towards the Ages, Delaware is currently 
contemplating whether or not it clone legislation in the 
wake of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, in order to 
remain competitive with the other states that have done so. To 
protect its state's 1 incorporations, the 
De Bar Assoc dra legislation 
that goes beyond the CTS. See "Compromise 
Near Delaware," December 21, 1987, Times at 22, 
attached hereto as Exhibit D. "Perhaps no public policy 
left in Delaware corporate except the objective of raising 
revenue." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law; Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663, 684 (1974), attached hereto as 
Exhibit E. 
It is increasingly evident that current corporate abuses 
are made possible by the fai states to enact or enforce 
rigorous corporation laws. The 1 justification for the 
usually worthwhile experimentation stimulated by competition 
among the states is, or has become, flawed.s Competition 
only works if the states must bear the costs of the benefits they 
provide to entice corporations. Imagine, for example, that a 
state had the authority to exempt corporations from all federal 
environmental laws. Many states would enact this legislation 
to encourage corporations to incorporate there, while safe in 
the knowledge that most of the factories would be located elsewhere. 
Economists call this an external , and that,is the problem with 
state corporation law. 
Delaware can make its laws as permissive as it wants because it 
bears such a tiny proportion6 of the consequences, and even that 
proportion is vastly outweighed by the benefits of the tax revenue. 
The "race to the bottom" continues as Delaware enacts legislation 
eliminating directors' personal liabil for much of their 
fiduciary duty. State after state responds to the prospect of 
takeover of a local company with self-serving and anti-takeover 
legislation in a frenzy of competitive charter-mongering. One 
particularly compelling drama took place in Massachusetts when 
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the law of a state other than 
because that state has the 
law applied. 
attached 
Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 
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bas on revenue 
primacy in 
choose Delaware 
no matter what 
compete. There 
, with its long 
tradition shareho and fiduciary 
stewardship, to defer unduly to Delaware's statutory 
3) seek This would involve 
a determinat cannot take action 
directly to on corporate 
governance provis desires, nonetheless, 
to continue to is field; and that 
it reluctantly cone on way to do 
this is by encouraging increas federal corporation 
law. California has a conspicuously effective dele-
gat in both of s and could have 
substantial influence on any laws that are passed. 
The question of whether the lie interest is 
best served having one federal or several state 
corporation laws has been debated since the beginnings 
of the Republic. At the constitutional convention, 
Alexander Hamilton raised the question whether to 
provide specially for a federal corporation power 
limited however to situations where the states did 
not have the apparent power to accomplish a particular 
desired objective. The motion was defeated 8 to 3. 
Federalizing corporate law has been the cry of the 
"reformers" right up to the recent proposals of Ralph 
Nader. The states have resisted all efforts in this 
direction with continuing success. The only incursions 
of federal f on the state preserve are contained 
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 with its 
provisions relating to fraud and proxy voting practices, 
amended by the Williams Act relating to takeovers. 
The State Bar Associations and their congressional 
allies have repeatedly beat back further federal 
involvement. But the crash of 1929 led to the first 
federal preemption of state corporate laws, and the 
current concerns over the October 1987 drop in market 
prices may provide another catacylsmic impetus for 
further legislation, although the particular culprits 
for Black Monday are less readily identifiable than 
the causes for 1929's crash. 
Under these conditions, some new federal 
legislation may be possible. Through its federal 
legislation, California could have an impact on the 
creation of such laws and thus indirectly regulate 
corporations with headquarters California as well 
as those doing business there. Realistically, however, 
it must be recognized that any federal legislation 
would naturally be the result of accomodating competing 
national interests. The end result of federal 
preemption could be a watering-down of shareholder 
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Section 2115 and, 
listing exemptions 
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, and . 
to give the 
buy the product 
are also 
Delaware's own law ce 
corporation law: 
known 
s succes 1 market 
WHEREAS, the favorable climate which the State 
of Delaware has traditionally provided for 
corporations has been a leading source of 
revenue for the State; and 
WHEREAS, many states have enacted new 
corporation laws in recent years in an effort 
to compete with Delaware for corporate 
business; and 
WHEREAS, there has been no comprehensive 
revision of the De ion Law since 
its enactment in 1898; and 
WHEREAS, the General Assembly of the State of 
Deleware declares to be the public policy of 
the State to maintain a favorable business 
climate and to encourage corporations to make 
Delaware domici . . . 
of its 
Law of December 31, 1963 v. 54, ch. 218 [1963] Del. Laws 724 
(emphasis added). 
3 Delaware's take from corporation franchise taxes continues 
to escalate dramatical : $60.5 million in 1978, $76.5 million 
in 1982 and $121 llion in 1985. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census 1 Gov't F es, GF79, No. 1, State Govern-
ment Tax Collections, 1979 and 1978 at 16 (1979); 1982 and 1981 
at 16 (1982); 1985 and 1984 at 12 (1985), attached hereto as 
Exhibit C. In 1987, Delaware's affected 18% of the 
states taxable income. See "Compromise Near In Delaware," 
December 21, 1987, New York Times at 22, Exhibit D. As a 
consequence of this se subs , individual and corporate 
taxes in Delaware are quite modest. 
4 "[T]he new Delaware law to protect endangered directors is 
producing sighs of rel [in corporate boardrooms]." Herzel, 
Sepro & Katz, From the Boardroom-- Next to Last Word on 
Endangered Directors, January-February 1987, Harvard Bus. Rev. 
at 39, attached hereto as Exhibit F. In the last legislative 
session, California fashioned a far more balanced and equitable 
bill to limit directors' liability. 
5 As is all too apparent to state legislators across the 
nation, Delaware has controlled both the pace and direction of 
statutory corporate law in the twentieth century. Delaware's 
position in corporate law sterns largely from the fact that 
Delaware law is considered more favorable to management than 
the law of any other state. Thus, to prevent corporations from 
deserting to the healthful climes of Delaware law, state 
legislators have been forced to relax local laws regulating 
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internal corporate affa s, 
public, shareholders, and 
sacrificed. 
ion of the 
has often been 
The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 Hastings L. J. 
119 (1976) (footnote omitted), attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
Since corporations have been able to circumvent a state's 
corporations code merely by incorporating in another state, 
there has been no incentive for a state to enact a relatively 
strict code. Similarly, attempts by states to regulate corporate 
activities more stringently have been undermined by those states 
which have enacted "enabling" type codes. Under the spectre of 
their domestic businesses incorporating or reincorporating 
elsewhere, with the concomitant loss of charter fees, franchise 
taxes, and control over corporations which transact business 
in the state, restrictive states have amended their laws to 
make them more enabling. 
Oldman, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations --
Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 85, 104-05 
(1977), attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
6 Professor Cary zeroed in on the absurdity of the "present 
predicament in which [Delaware] a pygmy among the 50 states 
prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national 
corporate policy as an incentive to encourage incorporation 
within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue." Cary 
Federalism and Corporate Law at 701 (emphasis added), Exhibit E. 
7 California's policy is to protect the public from fraud 
and deception in securities transactions. The Corporate Securities 
Law of 1968 was enacted to effectuate this policy by regulating 
securities transactions California and providing statutory 
remedies violat of Corporations Code, in addition 
to those available under common law. 
Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411, 417, 197 Cal. 
Rptr. 757 (1983) (all cases cited herein are attached hereto 
as Exhibit J). 
[Directors'] dealings with the corporation are subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements 
with the corporation is chall the burden is on the director 
. . . not only to prove of the transaction but 
also to show its inherent the viewpoint of the 
corporation and those 
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 
2d 405, 420-21, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). 
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footnotes continued) 
8 "Since there are a 1 number signif 
differences among the corporate laws of California, New York 
and Delaware regarding the manner in which corporate internal 
f are conducted, of internal affairs 
doctrine to [a pseudo-foreign corporation] results in significant 
soc cost. That cost is the nseudo-foreign corporation's 
ability to ignore the public policies of the state of its 
principal place of business." 
Trampling Upon the Tramp at 100-104 (emphasis added), Exhibit H. 
9 Section 309 reads as follows: 
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to 
determine the existence and extent of a director's or officer's 
liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders, 
except where, with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state has a more significant relationship under the principles 
stated in [Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws] Section 6 to 
the parties and the transaction, in which event the local of the 
other state will be applied. 
10 As Professor Cary observed: 
In my opinion, however [federal incorporation) is politically 
unrealistic. It has been raised many times in Congress and in 
the literature but has no public appeal. American business 
would unanimously reject such a convenient vehicle for government 
control of the major industries of this country . . . I do not 
advocate or even conceive of, federal incorporation as an 
imminent possibility except the event of a catastrophic 
depression or a corporate debacle. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 
83 Yale L. J. 663, 700 (1974), Exhibit E. 
11 The Supreme Court's decision in CTS materially changed the 
rules in a manner that could arguably justify federal intervention 
given the confusing and contradictory way that states have reacted 
to the CTS decision, which could have a negative effect on inter-
state commerce. The SEC's Office of the Chief Economist has 
evaluated the impact of an Ohio antitakeover statute on the 
value of shares in 36 companies with headquarters in that state. 
The Ohio law depressed stock prices by an average of two percent, 
with losses ranging from $754 million to $1.45 billion. This, 
by the way, refutes completely the arguments that anti-management 
to the detriment of shareholders. 
12 At a minimum, if Section 2115 is perceived as too sensitive 
a political issue for this legislative session, the Legislature 
should clearly express its intent that courts of this state 
should not be limited by the dictates of Section 2115 and that 
the conflicts-of-law analysis sketched on Page 8 can be used 




TAKEOVER LEGISLATION: VIEW FROM THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY 
BY W. PETER SLUSSER 
STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL CONTESTS 
There is a distinction between the propriety of state involvement 
in securities laws regulating s, and a traditional subject 
of state jurisiction, the regulation of the internal affairs 
of a corporation. Without seeing the specifics of a proposed 
state takeover act, it is not possible to comment on the position 
the securities industry would take with regards to a particular 
bill. However, the following principles would, we believe, guide 
the approach of the securities industry to this subject. 
CURRENT STATE REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS 
Consider the rather anomalous the current debate about 
state anti-takeover statutes. Virtual without exception, all 
of the provisions of state takeover bills could be individually 
adopted by shareholders of a corporation as amendments to the 
corporate charter. Since shareholders, the owners of the corpor-
ation, have an obvious in enhanc the value of their 
investment, if the provis such bills were as self-evidently 
beneficial to the companies as allege, shareholders 
would rush to propose and adopt amendments incorporating the 
substantive features of such ls. 
It seems very curious to securities industry that the lobbyists 
and the officers of major corporat should be petitioning 
the states to provide them ion" offered by 
such lls, appear protection could 
be obtained merely by drafted charter 
amendments to a vote at a s. The fact is 
that the supporters of evidently not willing to 
subject proposals vote. We are left with 
the question, who then proposals? That 
the proponents wish to c and pre-empt them 
from voting on such provis they are a good 
deal less sure of benef s from the passage 
of such bills than they are to incumbent management. 
Most of the recent 
assumption once a 
interest in a corporat , 
likely mean that the abil 
lls are based on the 
a significant ownership 
this position will 
of Directors to bargain 
Peter Slusser is Managing D of Merger and Acquisitions 
for Paine, Webber, in New York, New York 
that person will somewhat constra We find it ne 
sing nor objectionable that a party with a 20% interest 
corporation may have a considerab luence on the affairs 
, s e 
corporation and as a matter 
se benefit the fairs of 
wou object such a party were 
having such an influence. 
s are owners 
are primary group 
ion are run, we 
lly precluded from 
CURRENT EXAMPLES OF INAPPROPRIATE STATE REGULATION 
A patchwork quilt has been created by state anti-takeover statutes. 
New York was the first state to adopt a "five year freeze out" 
statute. This prohibits a "resident domestic corporation" (defined 
as a firm incorporated in New York with both its principal 
executive offices and significant business operations in the 
state, and which as at least ten percent of its stock owned 
beneficially by New York residents) from engaging in a business 
combination with an interested shareholder (a beneficial owner 
of twenty percent or more of a firm's voting stock) for a period 
of five years after the interested shareholder crosses the twenty 
percent ownersh threshold, unless the board of the resident 
domestic corporation has approved either the business combination 
itself or the stock purchase bringing the interested shareholder 
above the twenty percent threshold. 
Such a statute disenfranchises shareholders in charge of control 
situations, since decisions are placed solely in the hands of 
the Board of Directors. If the Board does not view the acquisition 
favorably, business combinations are absolutely forbidden for 
five years, no matter how shareholders may regard the matter. 
A very different approach was taken by that portion of the Indiana 
statute under review in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation 
of America (107 s. Ct. 1637). That statute provides that if 
a bidder buys shares of a corporation that is subject to the 
statute, and if such a purchase would. br-ing.:t.he bidder's voting 
power in the "target" above a certain threshold (20, 33 1/3 or 
50%) the bidder may acquire the voting rights of the acquired 
shares only with the approval of a majority of the corporation's 
" sinterested shares," i.e., those not owned by the bidder 
or management. This is typically called a "control share" statute. 
Although a majority of the Supreme Court found that the statute 
was constitutional since they viewed it as an investor protection 
measure consistent with the Williams Act, another portion of the 
statute (which was not under review in the case before the Court) 
adopted the New York five year freeze out provision as well, 
indicating that shareholder protection was not the sole or even 
the primary concern of the statute. 
Other states which have adopted control share statutes have 
differed considerably from Indiana's approach. For example, 
Ohio's Control Share Acquisitions Act applies to Ohio corporations 
having their principal places of business, principal executive 
offices or substantial assets within Ohio. The law, however, 
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does not re shareholders. North 
Carolina's recently adopted statute dispenses 
with Indiana's domes c rement and applies 
to corporations incorporated in other states but having more than 
forty percent of their fixed U.S. assets, more than forty percent 
of their U.S. employees, and more than ten percent of their 
shareholders resident in Carolina. Still another state 
that has adopted an anti-takeover statute, Pennsylvania, applies 
it only to Pennsylvania corporations, but does not require 
additional contacts, such as a principal place of business or the 
presence of shareholders within the state. 
It is often argued by proponents of state anti-takeover statutes 
that such laws are a traditional area for state legislation. 
In fact nothing is farther from the truth. In 1965 when Congress 
began work on various legislative proposals which ultimately 
resulted in passage of the Williams Act, not a single state had 
any sort of a takeover statute, although at that point states 
had been regulating corporations for more than 170 years. It 
is true that the Williams Act does not deal with state anti-
takeover laws, but that is because at the time state laws on the 
subject did not exist. Just shortly before the enactment of the 
Williams Act, Virginia became the first state to adopt such a 
statute. Almost all state takeover statutes currently on the 
books are less than five years old, and most of them were enacted 
after a local corporation had sensed that it might become a target. 
Notwithstanding our arguments above, if a state insists upon 
passing a takeover statute, before the securities industry court can 
support such a bill it must have certain characteristics. The 
securities industry would insist on a fair and even handed approach 
to takeover legislation, which is consistent with federal law. 
The Williams Act carefully adopts a policy of neutrality as 
between bidder and , ted provisions designed to 
provide full disclosure to shareholders. 
Congress was interested in maintaining a balance of power between 
corporate managers and corporate acquirors, and ensuring that 
shareholders had sufficient ion to make their own judgment 
concerning the merits of a proposal. Such an approach is essential 
to any state legislative proposal that would govern takeovers. 
Consequently, it is most unlikely that "freeze out" state statutes 
would ever receive the support of the securities industry. Nor 
are ''control share" bills 1 to be supported, because as a 
practical matter they always seem to contain provisions which 
lt the balance in favor incumbent management. 
For example, the portion of the Indiana statute upheld in CTS 
permitted only "disinterested" shares to vote on the question 
of whether a so-called control block of stock should be given 
voting rights. While on sur is seem evenhanded, 
upon analysis the "tilt" of provision becomes obvious. For 
instance, would anyone ly contend that in a contested 
election between a Democratic candidate and a Republican candidate 
that only citizens registered as should be permitted 
to cast a ballot, since Democrats and Republicans would be biased 
in favor of their own candidate? Just as an effort to disen-
franchise fellow citizens with a party affiliation from voting 
such an election would be absurd, it is likewise absurd to 
senfranchise fellow shareholders from voting in a change of 
corporate control situation because they may be predisposed to 
vote for one side or the other. Just as any citizen has an 
interest in good government and the selection of the best possible 
candidate for·political office, so too every shareholder has 
an interest in an efficiently run corporation and the selection 
of the best possible management. 
The practical effect of such provisions is to favor incumbent 
management, particularly since the management of many "target" 
corporations often have a small ownership interest in their 
own firms. No state permits only "disinterested" shareholders 
to vote on such matters as the election of directors or merger 
agreements, but if such an approach were as beneficial as claimed, 
there would be every reason for states to enact such provisions. 
Shareholders protection is the focus of the securities industry. 
We object to placing solely in the hands of one side the power 
to decide if an offer may be made to shareholders. A bill 
requiring shareholder approval of certain actions taken in 
response to a takeover bid moves closer to a position that the 
securities industry could support. This is best addressed, 
however, through those provisions of state corporate law that 
deal with shareholder voting. 
IF LEGISLATION IS TO BE ADOPTED MODIFYING THE REGULATION OF 
TAKEOVERS, IT SHOULD BE FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
By virtue of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and the 
practical need of regulation to reflect the interstate nature 
of the business, there is no role for the. states in the regulation 
of takeovers. 
If there is one proposition about the current federal regulatory 
scheme for tender offers which is manifest in the legislative 
history of the Williams Act, and the Williams Act itself, it is 
that the Act is neutral as between a tender offeror and a target 
corporation. The provisions of the Williams Act focus on 
assisting shareholder, not the management of either the target 
or the offeror. The sponsor of the Act, Senator Harrison Williams, 
made th point explicitly: "We have·taken extreme care to avoid 
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of 
the person making the takeover bids. S. 510 (the Senate Bill 
which became the Williams Act) is designed solely to require 
full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." 
(113 Cong. Rec. 24664 (1967) Remarks of Senator Williams.) 
The Edgar v. Mite and CTS decisions have not really altered 
that view in so far as the Supreme Court has continued to hold 
that the states cannot adopt laws that frustrate the purpose 
of Congress in adopting a national scheme of regulation. Without 
a national standard, protection of local, parochial interests 
occurs, often to the detriment of shareholder rights. 
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The answer is for the f l to reassert its role. 
There are two reasons for this: (1) state anti-takeover laws 
will make it impossible to achieve the goals of the Williams 
Act and (2) such laws Balkanize the economy and create the 
equivalent of domestic trade protection laws. 
States are justifiably concerned about employment and business 
within their own borders. But they are free to create an 
attractive business climate through a myriad of perfectly 
legitimate means, such as tax incentives, development and job 
training assistance, the creation of specialized research centers 
at state universities and so on. What a state should not be 
permitted to do is to declare a blockade against commerce among 
the states. 
The securities industry supports Congressional action that would 
clearly preempt the states from regulating corporate ,control 
contests. Such a preemption would imply a more active role for 
the SEC in establishing the appropriate level of investor pro-
tection and neutrality between bidders and targets, so as to 
allay the legitimate concerns of state legislators for the welfare 
of companies doing business in their states and shareholders 
investing in those companies. Amendments to the federal laws 
may be necessary to insure a "level playing field" between parties 
to a contested offer, full disclosure of all material facts 
pertaining to offers and management responses to offers, and 
sufficient time being granted to investors to properly study 
offers and for management to review, analyze and respond to 
offers. 
Explicitly preempting the states from regulating corporate 
takeovers does not violate the concept of "states rights," but 
instead asserts the national interest in a nationwide free market 
with appropriate shareholder safeguards. The choice is clearly 
presented to Congress; it must either preempt the states, or 
it must be prepared to see Williams Act rendered a nullity 
by state legislatures cajoled into enacting takeover restrictions 
tailor-made to accommodate the interests of incurnbant management. 
CHAPTER VII 
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION: A VIEW FROM PENSION FUNDS AND INVESTOR GROUPS 
BY JANICE HESTER 
Introduction 
Both public and private pension funds now occupy a unique 
position in the u.s. economy. Institutional investors, such 
as pension funds and endowment funds now account for the great 
majority of securities ownership in this country. These funds 
represent a significant resource for raising the necessary 
capital corporations require to fund and operate business 
enterprises. 
This provides jobs and other benefits to the general community, 
such as payrolls which can be taxed to provide goods and services 
to the public. The funds, though enormous in size, actually 
represent the interests of millions of small investors. For all 
practical purposes, the funds must be thought of as perpetual. 
For instance, the funding period for public pension funds is 
presently 30 to 50 years. In addition to the long-term nature 
of the funds, recent emographic changes in the general population 
have resulted in many pension funds having significant unfunded 
obligations: The general population is aging, therefore the number 
of persons receiving benefits from the funds is increasing while 
the number of active or working members is declining, with the 
result that many funds have a deficiency in funding. 
These unfunded obligations often number in the tens of billions 
of dollars and cannot be offset by contribution increases from 
members and employers. The investment retu~n and investment 
allocation posture of -funds becomes·important under these 
circumstances. 
Anti-Takeover Legislation and Stock Ownership 
Due to the long-term investment izon of public pension funds 
and the concerns over providing benefits to an ever aging population, 
stock ownership has become an important component of the investment 
management plans of such funds across the country. 
For example, the California State Teachers' Retirement System 
had a 25% limitation on stock ownership until legislation was 
passed to allow the use of the prudent man rule regarding investments 
in 1984. Actuarial studies, encompassing historical rates of 
return for various investment vehicles, wage inflation, projected 
benefit obligations, and general inflation suggested that the 
only way to alleviate the unfunded obligat and have sufficient 
assets to pay future benefits was to increase the percentage of 
Janice Hester is Corporate Affa s Advisor for the California 
State Teachers Retirement stem. 
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equity investments. A wel known study general market 
by Ibbottson and Sinquefield concluded that over a long period 
of time, the last fifty years, common stocks provided a superior 
rate of return to both corporate and government bonds. The size 
of public pension funds argues against high turnover idual 
SECUrities. 
Each time a security is sold or purchased, a commission must be 
paid. In addition, the positions that the funds hold in individual 
stocks are quite large and influence the pr s of the securit s 
which are targeted for investment or sale. This has led to an 
even greater percentage of both the equity and fixed income 
segments being indexed. For example, 79% of the equity segment 
of the California State Teachers' Retirement System's portfolio 
is indexed or passively managed. This means that the only way 
changes are made within those accounts is through takeovers, 
n:ergers, tender offers or involuntary liquidations, and bank-
ruptcies. The turnover in passively managed accounts is less 
than five percent annually.· This consideration argues for 
pension fund trustees being in favor of offers to buy their stock, 
whether such offers are sanctioned by management or hostile towards 
management or not. 
The enactment and adoption of management sponsored state anti-
takeover legislation and defensive anti-takeover corporate charter 
measures are unnecessary and unfair interpositions by management 
and its supporters between buyer and seller, in what is co~~only 
thought to be a free market economy. Furthermore, a fundamental 
rightof anyinvestor is the right to sell or retain an investment. 
It is investors who bear the risk of management's competence 
in running these corporations; and they bear this risk with their 
own capital. Although consideration of employees, suppliers, 
customers, community interest is certainly proper, the investor's 
interest should receive preference. In order to run a profitable 
and successful business, management should consider the above 
aspects. This is what investors, especially shareholders pay 
management to do. Presumably if management is doing its job 
well, and withprofits, dividends, and/or market appreciation 
responding accordingly, shareholders will be satisfied and not 
deslrous of selling their stock. If on the other hand, as is 
so often the case, assets are undervalued and it appears that 
incurnbent management is a new management to shepherd their 
strnents. Although management argues for defensive protections 
on the grounds that community interests will be harmed if they 
are not allowed, the evidence for this claim is not persuasive. 
Management causes plant closings, bankruptcies, moves operations 
to other states, causing dislocation of workers and hardships 
on particular dependent communities as well as bidders. Such 
decisions are made due to business and market concerns; the 
identity of the person responsible for implementing such decisions 
has no bearing. In addition, such legislation further isolates 
management from both its investors and employees. It is no _ 
longer accountable. If management is shielded from competition, 
who will be able to protest when market share is being lost due 
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to sharp foreign , or environmental concerns 
such as asbestos or pollution are hurting a particular company? 
In the long-run, granting this protection may cause all the 
hardships it is designed to prevent. It is neither to the benefit 
of shareholders, nor labor, governmental bodies or social and 
community interests to leave the power of management to run 
unchecked. 
Finally, it should be recognized that anti-takeover legislation, 
and def2nsive charter amendments do nothing to protect the jobs 
or employees or the interest of the community, suppliers or 
customers. This legislation protects the jobs of management. 
If more favorable legislation is passed in another state, management 
will reincorporate yet again. Management is not arguing for 
plant closing legislation or layoff prevention for lower level 
employees, including upper and middle management. This legislation 
is circled around the top ten or twelve persons in corporations 
which often have thousands of employees. 
Summary 
It is clear that the U.S. society and economv are changing in 
important ways. The average age of the population is increasing. 
This will mean that pension funds and retirement programs will 
face even greater demands for benefits in the future. For the 
majority of Americans, pension funds are now the investment 
vehicle; individual ownership of securities is on the decline. 
The size of these funds seems overwhelminq, but is should be 
remembered that they represent the interests of millions of small 
investors. 
If these funds are not able to earn an adequate investment return 
to cover benefit demands, taxpayers will have to provide for 
the deficiency. In the most recent bull market, takeovers were 
an important part of the wealth which was realized in the stock 
market. s wealth effect to the rest of the population, 
whether shareholders spend it on goods or reinvest it in another 
corporation. Thus, takeovers are beneficial to the general 
economy as well as to shareholders. It should be remembered 
that management isn't asking for legislation to eliminate takeovers, 
only to give it more of a bargaining chit in the process. Both 
labor and shareholders should oppose any further attempts by 
management to isolate itself, and avoid being held accountable 
for its actions. 
The long-term investment requirements of pension funds makes 
stock ownership a necessity, and in ever increasing precentages 
relative to total portfolio value. This argues for maximizing 
the investment return and an important component is the ability 
to take advantage of takeovers, mergers and tender offers. 
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